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The aim of this article is to present recent applications of emotion regulation theory
and methods to the field of psychotherapy. The term Emotion Regulation refers
to the neurocognitive mechanisms by which we regulate the onset, strength, and
the eventual expression of our emotions. Deficits in the regulation of emotions
have been linked to most, if not all, psychiatric disorders, with patients presenting
either dysregulated emotions, or dysfunctional regulatory strategies. We discuss the
implications of regulating emotions from two different theoretical perspectives: the
Cognitive Emotion Regulation (CER), and the Experiential-Dynamic Emotion Regulation
(EDER) model. Each proposes different views on how emotions are generated,
dysregulated and regulated. These perspectives directly influence the way clinicians
treat such problems. The CER model views emotional dysregulation as due to a deficit
in regulation mechanisms that prioritizes modifying or developing cognitive skills, whilst
the EDER model posits emotional dysregulation as due to the presence of dysregulatory
mechanisms that prioritizes restoring natural regulatory processes. Examples of relevant
techniques for each model are presented including a range of cognitive-behavioral, and
experiential (including both dynamic and cognitive) techniques. The aim of the paper
is to provide a toolbox from which clinician may gain different techniques to enhance
and maintain their patient’s capacity for emotional regulation. Finally, the biological
mechanisms behind the two models of emotion regulation are discussed as well as
a proposal of a dual route model of emotion regulation.
Keywords: emotion regulation, cognitive-behavioral therapy, schema therapy, experiential-dynamic therapy,
memory reconsolidation
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INTRODUCTION
When interacting with others, emotions are constantly generated
and guide our interpersonal experiences. Sometimes, regulating
our emotions and emotionally driven behaviors is essential for
creating healthy relationships. Emotion regulation refers to the
capacity to modulate some aspects of our emotional experiences
(Gross, 1998; Grecucci et al., 2013a,b,c; Grecucci et al., 2017).
Although emotion regulation was initially intended as a field
of basic research, clinicians quickly understood its relevance
for their practice. Studying the mechanisms involved in the
regulation of emotions is particularly relevant when considering
the failure to regulate interpersonal emotions and emotionally
driven behaviors that characterize psychiatric disorders (Kring
and Werner, 2004; Ochsner and Gross, 2008; Grecucci, 2012;
Giorgetta et al., 2012, 2014; Grecucci et al., 2015b, 2019; Messina
et al., 2016; De Panfilis et al., 2019; Sorella et al., 2019).
Nearly all psychiatric disorders include one or more primary
dysregulated emotions (e.g., anger in borderline personality
disorder, sadness in depression, fear in anxiety disorders,
shame in narcissistic personality disorders, etc.), or detrimental
regulatory strategies (avoidance of feared situations in anxiety
disorders, rumination in depression or excessive control of
bodily signals in hypochondria). Thus, the ability to regulate
emotions adaptively is essential for well-being. The ubiquitous
presence of emotion dysregulation in psychopathology may
suggest a potential unique focus for intervention across disorders.
Consistently, the importance of emotion regulation is now
recognized by numerous psychotherapy approaches. Despite
this general agreement, different routes can be observed in the
conceptualization of emotion regulation and in the associated
therapeutic techniques used in clinical practice.
Cognitive Emotion Regulation Model
(CER)
Cognitive-behavioral psychotherapists train their patients in
using attentional, cognitive and behavioral strategies to promote
their ability to cognitively control their emotions. This view is
consistent with the most popular model of emotion regulation
proposed by Gross (1998, 2014), and extensively investigated
in affective neuroscience (Ochsner et al., 2002; Ochsner and
Gross, 2005; Grecucci et al., 2013a,b,c). Gross’ “Process Model
of Emotion Regulation” is based on appraisal theory (Frijda,
1986; Scherer et al., 2001) and relies on the assumption that
events lead to cognitive appraisals that generate emotional
responses. According to CER, emotions are generated through
the following sequence: (1) an individual is exposed to a situation
(Situation); (2) he/she attends to a particular aspect of the
situation (Attention); (3) interprets the situation (Appraisal); and
(4) produces an emotional response at a behavioral, subjective
and physiological level (Response). Gross suggests that emotion
regulation or dysregulation can occur within any of the five stages
or points of the process model through use of the following
strategies at each point: (1a) situation selection, (1b) situation
modification, (2) attentional deployment, (3) cognitive change,
(4) response modulation. In this view, the main mechanism of
dysregulation is the lack of, or failure to apply, an appropriate
regulatory strategy and every emotion can in principle become
dysregulated. We make the point, that the field of cognitive-
behavioral therapies from Beck (2011) to third wave therapies like
Dialectical Behavior Therapy Linehan, 1993a,b) use interventions
for emotional regulation that fit with the CER model.
Experiential-Dynamic Emotion
Regulation Model (EDER)
Differently from CBT, other approaches such as psychodynamic
therapy (Gabbard, 2014) and humanistic therapies (Perls
et al., 1951; Rogers, 1951; Berne, 1961), and new approaches
such as schema therapy (Young et al., 2003) and emotion-
focused therapy (Greenberg, 2004), largely employ experiential
techniques that work on emotion themselves by recreating real
experiences that allow the expression of feelings, attitudes, and
beliefs, instead of their control. As a matter of fact, individuals can
actively regulate their emotional state by allowing themselves to
experience it, focusing on their bodily sensations and becoming
aware of the emotional state itself (Vandekerckhove et al.,
2011, 2012). Within this framework, experiencing emotions
is critical in that it involves overcoming avoidance, leading
individuals to learn that they are more able to cope with their
most painful feelings and emotions after having faced them
and survived to them (Greenberg and Bolger, 2001). Some
theorists also suggest that experiential or bodily felt feeling,
together with affective self-awareness, may be considered as
more beneficial than an overall cognitive focus (Vandekerckhove
et al., 2012; Vandekerckhove and Wang, 2018). Experiential
techniques cannot be explained by the CER model. Thus, a
different framework has been proposed called “Experiential-
Dynamic Emotion Regulation” model (EDER, Grecucci, 2012;
Grecucci et al., 2015b, 2016; Frederickson et al., 2018). In the
EDER model, emotions are posited to be prewired and partially
independent of cognition: situations trigger emotional responses
(subjective and physiological reactions) from which a coherent
expression-action is produced. These approaches are grounded in
affective neuroscience findings (Panksepp, 1998; Damasio, 1999;
Panksepp and Biven, 2012; Herwig et al., 2010; Lutz et al., 2012),
which consider that emotions generated by mainly subcortical
areas (Panksepp and Biven, 2012), rise, peak, and then go flat
with a Gaussian-like shape, all this proportional to the nature
and intensity of the stimulus (Grecucci and Job, 2015; see also
Campos et al., 2004 for a similar account). According to this
view, no voluntary effort is required to regulate emotions and
emotions are not inherently dysregulated (Frederickson et al.,
2018). Once experienced, an emotion informs cognitive appraisal
of the situation and can be expressed and channeled into healthy
actions (Frederickson, 2013. In line with psychodynamic and
affective neuroscience principles, we point out the idea that when
dysregulation is present, it is due to: (1) excessive conditioned
anxiety (anxiety triggered by the perception and/or experience of
an emotion); or (2) defense mechanisms which create defensive
affects (Frederickson, 2013) (or secondary emotions). EDER
defines both cases of “excessive anxiety” and “defensive affects”
as Dysregulated Affective States (DAS). In this framework
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TABLE 1 | Comparing two models of emotion regulation.
Cognitive emotion regulation model Experiential-dynamic emotion regulation model




Voluntarily cognitive top-down regulatory strategies at different
levels (situation selection, situation modification, etc.)
The brain self-regulates emotions through a biological
mechanism that return them to baseline
Emotion dysregulation Failure to use regulatory strategies After emotion is generated, dysregulatory mechanisms
intervene that stop self- regulatory
What is dysregulated Every emotion in principle is down- or up-regulated Anxiety and defensive affects are to be down-regulated (or
blocked)
Therapeutic strategy The clinician teaches the patient emotion regulation strategies The clinician helps the patient to remove dysregulatory
mechanisms and to down- regulate DAS
Treatment modalities Cognitive-Behavioral Therapies, Dialectical Behavior therapy,
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy




Processing Top-down, voluntary, explicit, conscious, verbally mediated Bottom-up, not voluntary, implicit, unconscious, independent
from language
Neural basis Mainly cortical and lateralized at left Mainly subcortical and lateralized at right
emotional regulation is achieved by removing dysregulatory
mechanisms (conditioned anxiety and defensive affects, DAS),
as opposed to adding or learning new regulatory strategies (as
prescribed by CER, see Table 1). Once dysregulatory mechanisms
are removed, the patient is able to experience the underlying
primary emotion (Coughlin della Selva, 1996; McCullough, 1997;
Frederickson, 2013). Moreover, while CER assumes that every
emotion is subjected to abnormal up- or down-regulation, EDER
holds that primary emotions (or emotions reactive to the event)
are to be facilitated in their experience/expression (even up-
regulated where needed), and secondary emotions (anxiety and
defensive emotions, i.e., DAS) are to be down-regulated (or
even blocked). Differences between CER and EDER models are
summarized in Table 1. In the next sections, we present in
detail these two frameworks providing examples of different
emotion regulation technique proposed in the context of different
psychotherapies. With this effort, our aim is to provide a toolbox
from which clinician may gain different techniques to enhance
and maintain their patient’s capacity for emotional regulation,
and stress their relation with emotion regulation problems.
Indeed, some of the techniques presented are taken from the
previous literature, but their relation with emotion regulation and
dysregulation has not fully explored yet.
With this effort, our aim is to provide a comprehensive
theoretical framework based on emotion regulation theories for
the conceptualization of therapeutic techniques coming from
different psychotherapy approaches. A sort of toolbox from
which clinician may gain different techniques to enhance and
maintain their patient’s capacity for emotional regulation.
COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL TECHNIQUES
TO REGULATE EMOTIONS
In this section we focus on therapeutic techniques developed as
part of CBT approaches which are consistent with CER model.
We make the point that these techniques are based on the
view of emotion dysregulation as a lack of regulatory strategies
coherently with CER model. In line with the Process Model
part of the CER model (Gross, 1998), emotion dysregulation is
treated through teaching the patient with: (i) behavioral strategies
(e.g., selecting and exposing to appropriate situations and
adaptive situation modification, point 1a and 1b in the Process
Model); (ii) attentional strategies (e.g., distraction from negative
cues, concentration on positive cues, point 2); (iii) cognitive
methods (e.g., cognitive restructuring, point 3); and (iv) response
modulation (e.g., applied relaxation). In CBT approaches, several
techniques have been described, correspondent to the different
phases of the Process Model proposed by Gross (1998).
Cognitive Change (or Reappraisal)
Cognitive change is the core of Cognitive Behavior Therapy
(CBT) approaches. According to this approach, emotion follows
cognition and are directly influenced by them. In other words, as
Greenberger and Padesky (2015) phrase it “changing cognition
changes emotions” and “It’s the thought that counts.” Thus, many
CBT strategies serve the aim of changing the appraisal of a
stimulus so that a different emotional or mood outcome can be
achieved. A distressing emotional state can thereby be regulated
when the person is able to adjust their perspective on the stimulus
that distresses them (cognitive top down modulation over
emotions). To this aim the intervention require the following
steps:
1. The starting point in CBT is measuring symptoms and
distress across different situations (Hawton et al., 1989;
Westbrook et al., 2011). The therapist helps the patient to
focus on the stimulus that precedes the emotion to find
the maladaptive appraisal that generated that dysregulated
emotion. The patient may be asked to focus on what
thoughts are distressing or symptomatic for them.
2. The next stage within the CBT protocol involves more
detailed identification of the cognitions or thoughts
associated with the problematic symptoms. Thoughts
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about feelings, thoughts about thoughts, thoughts about
physiology or behavior are identified and monitored
across different situations (Beck, 2011; Westbrook et al.,
2011). A variety of techniques are used that may include
keeping a thought diary whilst exposed to different
situations or using role play or imagery during a therapy
session to improve thought recollection associated with
the problematic situations. A technique called “downward
chaining” (Beck, 2011), where a patient is repeatedly asked
“What is so bad about that?”, is used to uncover deeply
held beliefs about self, other and the world that may be
producing symptoms.
3. The previous steps are aimed to reach the core of
CBT intervention: changing appraisals or thoughts (or
Reappraisal). Several techniques may be used to promote
reappraisal:
a. Socratic questioning (Beck and Emery, 1985; Westbrook
et al., 2011), also termed guided discovery (Kuyken
and Padesky, 2011). This is a questioning style that
seeks to uncover how the patient thinks and arrives at
their distressing conclusions, and supports the patient
to take different perspectives to reach less distressing
conclusions. Greenberger and Padesky (2015) have
added socratic questions into their thought diaries to
prompt patients to question their automatic thinking
styles. Lists of ready-made “cognitive distortions” or
“thinking errors” are often used as short hand to help
patients identify symptom-maintaining thoughts.
b. Role playing or guided imagery to help the patient
rescript a particular scenario in order to arrive at a
new appraisal. Coping statements may be prepared
by therapist and patient that serve as ready-made
alternative appraisals which the patient can remind
themselves of during problematic situations.
c. Behavioral experiments within CBT support cognitive
reappraisal by investigating evidence to support one
thought as opposed to another thought (different from
behavioral experiments in behavioral approaches that
aims to habituation to a problematic stimulus and
extinguish a conditioned response). Such experiments
could be active (trying new behaviors) or observational
(seeing what happens in different situations).
Response Modulation
Physical techniques (Westbrook et al., 2011) are focused on
regulating levels of physiological arousal and include various
forms of relaxation, controlled breathing and physical exercise.
These techniques either raise the patient’s arousal level so that
they are alert enough to engage their thinking, or lower the
arousal level that impedes clear thought. Physical techniques
primarily address anxiety symptoms. However, these techniques
are used sparingly since physical techniques may maintain
dysfunction when they are used to avoid thought change.
For example, a patient might use breathing techniques to
reduce distress without examining and changing their distress-
maintaining thoughts.
Mindfulness-Based Techniques
We include mindfulness among CBT techniques, although it
is now used by many psychotherapy approaches, compared to
the previous techniques. Mindfulness principles are increasingly
being applied in the so-called third generation CBTs, such as
the Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) (Hayes et al.,
2011), Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT) (Linehan, 1993a,b),
Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT) (Segal et al., 2012),
Compassion-focused Therapy CFT (Gilbert, 2009). Mindfulness-
based methods teach patients to either focus their attention on
specific meditation objects, typically breath or bodily sensations,
with a non-judgmental attitude and receptive awareness of any
thought, emotion or sensation that occurs moment-to-moment
(Linehan, 1993a; Hayes et al., 2011; Lutz et al., 2012; Segal et al.,
2012). Thus, it involves several aspects of emotion regulation:
attentional deployment (for example to bodily sensations instead
that to stressful stimuli), cognitive change (non-judgmental
approach to emotions) and response modulation (non-reaction
attitude). An important aspect of mindfulness-based practice
is that patients learn how to detach and be less absorbed in
unhelpful thoughts and emotions; in particular to experience
thoughts as products of the mind, i.e., thoughts are what they
are (thoughts), not what they say they are (facts). This process
is referred to as cognitive defusion or reperception (Hayes
et al., 2011) or also intimate detachment or decentering (see in
Grecucci et al., 2015a) (Table 2).
EXPERIENTIAL-DYNAMIC TECHNIQUES
TO REGULATE EMOTIONS
Beyond the context of CBT traditional approaches, the CER
model of emotion regulation has been considered as just one
way for the conceptualization of therapeutic intervention on
emotion regulation (see for example Messina et al., 2016).
For example, cognitive and attention resources required for
the CBT techniques described above may be depleted and
unavailable for optimal use when strong emotional activation
occurs (Opialla et al., 2015). Indeed, studies on how individuals
choose regulatory strategies observed that reappraisal strategies
are more likely to be chosen for low intensity emotional stimuli
(Sheppes et al., 2011; Sheppes, 2014). Moreover, in some cases,
the cognitive control of emotion can have negative consequences.
An example are the well-described paradoxical effects of cognitive
control on the incursion of unwanted thoughts (Wegner et al.,
1987; Abramowitz et al., 2001). Additionally, some theorists
consider cognitive control-based approaches as a “narrow view”
in emotion regulation research (Greenberg and Vandekerckhove,
2008), since they generally imply an emotion generation system
and a subsequent one, aimed at regulating emotions. According
to this perspective, when an emotion arises, it consequently
has to be regulated. Conversely, experiential therapies suggest a
“broader view,” in which emotions can be inherently regulated as
well as regulatory. Experiential therapies – such as the emotion-
focused one (Greenberg, 2004) – not only involve accessing the
primary emotions often underlying secondary symptomatic ones,
but also the awareness, experience and tolerance of underlying
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TABLE 2 | Standard Cognitive-Behavioral techniques for regulating emotions.
Mode Regulatory process (according to CER) Strategy/Intervention Model of therapy
Behavioral Response modulation Progressive muscle relaxation, diaphragmatic
breathing
CBT
Behavioral Situation selection, appraisal Behavioral activation, systematic desensitization CBT
Behavioral Situation selection, attention, appraisal,
response modulation
Exposure and response prevention, behavioral
experiments
CBT
Behavioral Situation modification, appraisal, response
modulation
Opposite action DBT, ACT
Cognitive Appraisal Psychoeducation and normalization All CBT-derived
therapies
Cognitive Attention, Appraisal, Response modification Monitoring thoughts and feelings through diary
keeping, Problem solving, weighing pros and cons
CBT, DBT, ACT
Cognitive Appraisal Image rescripting CBT
Mindfulness-based Attention, response modulation Distraction, mindfulness meditation, thought
defusion and attitudes, Compassionate imagery
MBSR, MBCT, ACT,
DBT, MBRP
CER, cognitive emotion regulation; CBT, cognitive-behavioral therapy; DBT, dialectical behavioral therapy; ACT, acceptance and commitment therapy; MBSR, mindfulness-
based stress reduction; MBCT, mindfulness-based cognitive therapy; MBRP, mindfulness-based relapse prevention.
emotions as a first step in the subsequent reduction of negative
affect in the longer run (Hunt, 1998).
In the present section, we describe experiential techniques
aimed to regulate emotions, which extend the options of
intervention for the therapist. Experiential techniques are
strategies designed to promote the transformation of emotions,
as opposed to strategies that target processes that are related to
emotions (thinking, attention, behavior). Experiential techniques
have been mainly proposed as part of modern approaches
of psychodynamic psychotherapy such as Intensive Short-
Term Dynamic Psychotherapy, ISTDP (Davanloo, 1990, 2000;
ten Have-de Labije and Neborsky, 2012; Frederickson, 2013;
Abbass, 2015; Messina et al., 2020), Accelerated Empathic
Dynamic Psychotherapy, AEDP (Fosha, 2000), Affect Phobia
Therapy, APT (McCullough, 1997); and Intensive Experiential
Dynamic Psychotherapy, IE-DP, Osimo, 2003). We refer to
ER techniques coming from these approaches as experiential-
dynamic techniques. Other experiential techniques have been
proposed as part of third wave cognitive approaches, such
as Schema Therapy (Young et al., 2003) and Acceptance and
Commitment Therapy (Hayes et al., 2011). We describe this
second category of experiential techniques within the category
experiential-cognitive techniques. Despite their differences,
both categories involve psychological processes which are
not contemplated in the CER model, whereas they may
find a common theoretical basis in the EDER model of
emotion regulation.
In the field of experiential dynamic therapies and in
accordance with recent findings in Affective Neuroscience
(Panksepp and Biven, 2012), emotions are understood to
be generated through subcortical neuroperception of the
environment and the experience of stimuli in reality (Davanloo,
1990, 2000; Benjamin, 1993; Coughlin della Selva, 1996;
Panksepp, 1998; Damasio, 1999; Frederickson, 2013; Pappaianni
et al., 2019). Emotions are hard-wired at birth (Panksepp,
1998) with inborn adaptive action tendencies (Frijda, 1986).
Primary feelings (directly elicited by the stimulus, and not
by defenses) motivate us to take effective action in response
to a situation (Damasio, 1999; Grecucci et al., 2015b). They
allow us to assert ourselves when wronged, to celebrate when
victorious, and to grieve when we experience loss. So why do
seemingly adaptive emotions become dysregulated? Following
Experiential-Dynamic Therapy (EDT) principles we propose two
primary causes: (1) true emotion can be paired with excessive
anxiety due to conditioning (Davanloo, 1990, 2000; Coughlin
della Selva, 1996; Frederickson et al., 2018); or (2) the patient
uses defenses which create dysregulated emotions (Davanloo,
1990, 2000; Coughlin della Selva, 1996; Frederickson et al.,
2018). We define both as Dysregulated Affective States, DAS
(Frederickson et al., 2018). From an experiential-dynamic point
of view, the therapist must help the patient to both regulate
anxiety and let go of the defenses that create (secondary)
defensive affects causing the DAS-associated symptoms. Then
the patient must face the underlying feelings that triggered
anxiety, that may be even up-regulated. From evolutionary
theory (Panksepp, 1998) we understand that life situations trigger
feelings that mobilize adaptive action (Frijda, 1986). However,
coherently with an attachment perspective (Bowlby, 1969, 1973,
1980), children experiencing these emotions may discover that
experiencing and expressing their feelings threatens the security
of their relationships, which is signaled to the child by a rise
in anxiety (signaling an internal and interpersonal danger). The
combination of emotion and overwhelming anxiety creates a
dysregulated affective state (DAS) due to excessive conditioned
anxiety (Grecucci et al., 2015b; Frederickson et al., 2018).
Anxiety Regulation
To assess and regulate anxiety, dynamic approaches pay attention
to the bodily symptoms of anxiety which are correlated with
patterns of activation of the somatic and autonomic nervous
systems. Low level anxiety is discharged into the somatic
nervous system (the striated muscles, Davanloo, 2000): the
patient becomes tense, gets tension headaches, and sighs when
the therapist explores feelings. When anxiety rises too high,
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the somatic nervous system turns off, and the parasympathetic
nervous system turns on, yielding symptoms of nausea in
the stomach, sudden needs for defecation and urination,
stomach aches, and migraine headaches. Now anxiety must be
regulated. When anxiety rises even higher, the activation of the
parasympathetic nervous system becomes even more extreme,
causing cognitive/perceptual disruption (Davanloo, 2000). Now
the patient suffers dizziness, blurry vision, ringing in the
ears, and problems in thinking and perception. Now anxiety
regulation is imperative. The experiential dynamic therapist
explores emotions to help the patient develop the capacity to
bear her feelings at progressively higher levels without anxiety
(Frederickson, 2013; Abbass, 2015). The therapist explores
feelings until anxiety is too high. Then the therapist regulates
anxiety. Then feelings are gradually explored again. In this
stepwise exposure method, the therapist builds the patient’s
capacity to bear the full extent of her feelings without becoming
dysregulated by anxiety.
Defensive Affects Restructuring
A second form of emotion dysregulation occurs when the
patient’s defenses cause a defensive affect (Davanloo, 1990, 2000;
Coughlin della Selva, 1996; Frederickson, 2013; Abbass, 2015).
For example, a woman is assaulted by a man (stimulus in reality).
This triggers anger (“true” feeling) and, as a result, she can fight
him off. However, suppose she shows up in a therapist’s office and
is terrified of the therapist, imagining that he is angry. Here she
projects her anger upon the therapist (defense). Her defense of
projection creates the defensive affect of fear. When the patient’s
fear results from projection, the therapists need to deactivate the
projection (Beck and Emery, 1985; Davanloo, 2000; Frederickson,
2013). Then, anxiety resulting from the projection will drop.
Here, cognitive and experiential dynamic therapists agree. Let’s
assume the therapist asked what feelings the patient had toward
an assailant and she replied, “I’m afraid you might criticize me”
(Defense of projection). Then she becomes weepy and depressed
(Defensive affect). First, the therapist will help the patient see the
defense of projection and then help her see the costs to increase
her motivation of not using it anymore. If the patient stops relying
on defenses, anxiety and defensive affects drop.
Emotional Recognition, Expression, and
Experiencing
To prevent future relapse, experiential dynamic therapists will
also explore the true feeling which triggered the defense
(Davanloo, 1990, 2000; Coughlin della Selva, 1996; Frederickson,
2013). The therapist can explore the feeling underneath the
defense of self-criticism. By exploring the patient’s feelings,
the therapist helps the patient feel her feelings without using
defenses which formerly caused dysregulating emotions. By
doing so, the therapist builds the patient’s capacity for tolerating
high levels of affect without using a dysregulating defense
(Davanloo, 1990, 2000; Coughlin della Selva, 1996; Greenberg
and Vandekerckhove, 2008; Frederickson, 2013; Abbass, 2015).
Now she can channel her “true” feelings into adaptive action with
less risk of relapse (Johansson et al., 2014). See Table 3.
COGNITIVE-EXPERIENTIAL
TECHNIQUES
Experiential techniques have been originally proposed in the
context of Gestalt therapy (Perls et al., 1951), Experiential-
dynamic therapies (Davanloo, 1990), and Transactional Analysis
(Erskine, 2010). However, they have been incorporated in
recent models of cognitive therapy such as Schema Therapy
(Young et al., 2003), and partially also into Acceptance and
Commitment therapy (Hayes et al., 2011). In this section we
focus on Schema Therapy as an example of this integration of
cognitive and experiential strategies to treat emotion regulation
problems. Indeed, beside cognitive and behavioral interventions,
Schema Therapy (ST) uses experiential techniques to target
emotion dysregulation. Schema Therapy proposes that Early
Maladaptive Schemas (EMS) and pathological Modes underlie
and cause emotional dysregulation (Young et al., 2003; Kellogg
and Young, 2006; Lobbestael and Arntz, 2010; Dadomo et al.,
2016, 2018; Grecucci et al., 2018). We understand emotion
dysregulation by focusing on four different macro-categories
of modes (Dadomo et al., 2016, 2018). These modes are
associated with specific dysregulated emotions. Innate Child
Modes (that include childhood states posited as innate such
as Vulnerable, Angry, Impulsive, and Contented Child Modes),
dysfunctional Coping Modes (that include Compliant, Detached
Protector, and Overcompensating Modes), dysfunctional Parent
Modes (Punitive and Demanding/Critical Modes) and an overall
functional Healthy Adult Mode.
Within ST, the techniques that address EMS draw on the canon
of CBT techniques to correct for the distortions in beliefs about
self and others. Dysregulated emotion is therefore achieved by
addressing negative schemas by using the CER model as outlined
above in our discussion on CBT. However, ST introduces an
additional experiential dimension to shift negative schemas and
regulate emotion by using “Modes.” Mode work proceeds by (1)
identifying the operative Mode, (2) deactivating or reducing the
intensity of the dysfunctional Mode, and (3) activating a more
functional Mode.
The patient’s specific interpersonal difficulties are discussed
to help them access and elaborate negative emotions related to
particular modes (Kellogg and Young, 2006). The ST therapist
monitors the patient’s type of emotions and manner of their
expression to help the patient identify which Mode may be
active (e.g., the patient who avoids feeling during the recollection
of trauma is activating the dysfunctional Coping Mode of
Detached Protector).
Limited Reparenting
At the core of the ST approach is the therapist’s use of Limited
Reparenting that provides a corrective emotional-relational
experience, and produces a great source of interpersonal emotion
regulation. The therapist responds to the patient’s developmental
and attachment needs (Arntz, 2011) by providing warmth,
empathy, compassion, as well as showing firmness, reciprocity,
a respect for limits, and a recognition of the patient’s rights
(Dadomo et al., 2016). Such limited reparenting seeks to develop
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TABLE 3 | Experiential-dynamic techniques for regulating emotions.
Mode Regulatory process
(according to EDER)
Strategy/Intervention Model of therapy
Experiential-
Dynamic
Anxiety regulation – Identification
– Enhancing bodily awareness
– Differentiating feeling from anxiety
– Introducing isolation of affect
– Changing the pathway of unconscious anxiety discharge





– Blocking the defense
– Identifying the defense
– Clarifying the price of the defense
– Clarifying the function of the defense
– Pointing out causality,
– Differentiating reality from fantasy
– Changing the system of defenses used by the patient
ISTDP, AEDP, APT, IE-DP
Experiential-
Dynamic
Emotion recognition – Identification
– Labeling
– Enhancing bodily awareness
– Helping to observe emotions
– Differentiating feelings from anxiety and defenses
– Differentiating true feelings from defensive affects
ISTDP, AEDP, APT, IE-DP
Experiential-
Dynamic
Emotion expression – Experiencing feeling physically in the body
– Experiencing the impulse physically in the body
– Building affect tolerance
– Encourage in vivo desensitization
ISTDP, AEDP, APT, IE-DP
Relational Emotion experiencing – Focusing and facilitating patient-therapist interactions and explore the generated affects
– Validating, affirming, encouraging patient’s affective experience
– Expression of therapist’s empathic and affective response
– Monitoring, mirroring and make explicit non-verbal responses
AEDP
EDER, experiential-dynamic emotion regulation; ISTDP, intensive short term dynamic psychotherapy; AEDP, accelerated empathic dynamic psychotherapy; APT, affect
phobia therapy; IE-DP, intensive experiential dynamic psychotherapy.
the patient’s Healthy Adult Mode, which is a position from
which the patient can see their own needs, understand reality,
and become more autonomous. The patient thus internalizes
the therapist’s modeling of healthy adult function and emotional
regulation abilities. The Critical Parent Mode has to be overcome
before the patient can allow themselves within their Child Mode
to experience and express feeling and desires that were banished
or frustrated by the dysfunctional Parent Modes.
Emphatic Confrontation
Experiential techniques include empathic confrontation, imagery
rescripting, and chair work. After deactivating the dysfunctional
mode, a more functional one is activated: for example, the
(Functional) Happy Child (Young et al., 2003; Martin and Young,
2010). In this step, the patient experiences an up-regulation of
positive emotions, but also self-soothing, calming emotions that
down-regulate unpleasant emotions. One of the key elements in
all ST’s techniques is the “validation process.” What the patient
feels is never “wrong,” and all emotions do have a meaning. This
validation of dysfunctional modes of coping is reached through
Empathic confrontation. During sessions, the therapist shows
that he/her understands why the patient shows dysfunctional
patterns, and explains how they are relative to traumatic
childhood experiences Beyond empathic confrontation, an
empathic attitude of the therapist can be considered the basis
for all therapeutic interventions. Communication research has
largely contributed to the description of empathic interventions
emphasizing the role of non-verbal aspects such as prosody
or physiological synchronization (Wynn and Wynn, 2006;
Cameron, 2011; Messina et al., 2013; Buchholz, 2014; Weiste
and Peräkylä, 2014; Peräkylä et al., 2015; Buchholz et al., 2017;
Voutilainen et al., 2018).
Imagery Rescripting
When the patient is emotionally highly activated during a session,
and shows his/her vulnerability, imagery rescripting exercises
are used, in which schemas and modes are activated with their
associated unpleasant emotions (Holmes et al., 2007; Arntz,
2012). Imagery rescripting represent a mean to regulate traumatic
dysregulated emotions of the past. The goal of these exercises is
to rewrite traumatic childhood experiences and help the patient
elaborate dysregulated emotions, giving them new meaning
through the therapist’s intervention in imagery (Arntz, 2011).
Chair-Work
Patients that show strong emotional dysregulation often show
low metacognition levels: they struggle to understand what
happens inside them when triggers are activated. This situation
causes fast flipping from one mode to another, in what the
patients describe as a strong internal confusion. This is often
associated to a strong feeling of discomfort. For this reason, chair-
work is used in ST (Kellogg and Young, 2006). This technique
is based on the dialogue between the patient’s different modes,
so that he/she can understand which mode is active and the
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TABLE 4 | Cognitive-experiential techniques for regulating emotions.




– Understanding the basic emotional needs not met in patient’s life
– Establishing a secure attachment with the therapist





– Identifying the coping mode in the session
– Validation of coping mode
– Emphatic understanding of basic needs and emotions
– Memory of emotional needs not satisfied in life events





– Creating a safe place
– Recognizing an actual specific need not met in a present situation
– Creating a bridge with past situations and meeting unfulfilled needs using reparenting
– Understanding the continuity of needs
– Focus on the specific emotion felt during and after reparenting
– Understanding how to meet basic emotional needs
– Coming back to the present and feeling the difference
– Being aware about the link between past traumatic experience and present feelings







– Creating a link between the modes and chair
– Ability to recognize ad differentiate different mental states
– Moving from one chair to another by active mode at that time
– Awareness about the internal dynamics
ST/Gestalt
dysregulation it produces (Van Vreeswijk et al., 2015). Some
modes, such as Vulnerable Child and Dysfunctional Parent, are
closely integrated. These modes are correlated to the patient’s
feeling of guilt, vulnerability and sadness. The patient gains
awareness through chair-work on how guilt is caused by a
Dysfunctional Parent, an internalization of past interactions
with his/her caregivers that causes sadness and anguish to the
Vulnerable Child. Learning to distinguish different modes is the
basis for functionally coping with them (Ball, 1998; Holmes et al.,
2007; Edwards and Arntz, 2012). In the last years experiential
exercises are found to be the most efficient in handling emotional
dysregulation and changing EMSs. The emotional techniques
used in Schema Therapy (ST) are been hypothesized to be able
to reach emotional structures of the brain such as the amygdala,
in which emotional memories are stored (LeDoux et al., 1989). In
ST, the therapist helps the patient activate these memories, going
from present emotion and body sensation to the very past ones,
to satisfy unmet needs (Martin and Young, 2010). Emotional
memories are then rewritten through experiential techniques,
such as partial reparenting and imagery rescripting. In this way,
ST fosters emotion regulation (Table 4).
TWO BIOLOGICAL MECHANISMS
BEHIND EMOTION REGULATION IN
PSYCHOTHERAPY AND AN
INTEGRATIVE PROPOSAL
Scholars agree on the necessity of incorporating findings and
strategies from different therapeutic models into their clinical
practice. In this paper we put forward the idea that the clinician
can integrate a wide range of techniques to foster emotion
regulation according to the needs of their patients. One strategy
can work for one patient, but not for the another one. In
paragraph 2, 3, and 4, we presented briefly different sets of
approaches to reach this aim. In this paragraph, we suggest
a dual route model of emotion regulation that integrates the
two approaches described above (CER and EDER) and that can
guide the clinician to select the best strategy to foster a better
emotional experience in his/her patients. We believe CER and
EDER as two complementary approaches that rely on parallel
pathways that enable emotion regulation in patients. CER is a
more cognitive-attentive and top-down process, EDER is a more
emotion focused and bottom-up way of reworking dysregulated
affective states. This division parallels previous considerations
of other authors regarding “changing emotions with cognition”
vs. “changing emotion with emotion” (Greenberg, 2004) and
other models of dual route in psychotherapy (see for example,
Levin, 2010).
We make the point that these two approaches rely on
two different psychological and neural mechanisms: memory
extinction and reconsolidation. Until 1989 neuroscientists agreed
on the fact that once an (emotional) learning had occurred,
it was permanently stored in memory circuits (LeDoux et al.,
1989; Roozendaal et al., 2009). The only possibility to “change”
that learning was to suppress it temporally with a new learning.
A procedure known as Extinction, that will briefly outline here.
One way to study the formation of fear memories is Pavlovian
conditioning. During Pavlovian conditioning, a neutral stimulus
(e.g., a tone, Conditioned stimulus, CS), is paired with an aversive
stimulus (e.g., footshock, Unconditioned stimulus, US). The US
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 June 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 930
fpsyg-11-00930 June 2, 2020 Time: 20:39 # 9
Grecucci et al. Emotion Regulation in Psychotherapy
FIGURE 1 | The dual route model of emotion regulation. On the Left the Cogntive emotion regulation route. ON the Right the Experiential dynamic emotion regulation
model.
elicits spontaneous fear reactions (freezing, avoidance, etc.). After
a number of tone-footshock pairings, the CS becomes able to
elicit fear reactions (Conditioned response, CR). Now a new
learning has been acquired (say memory trace #1). Extinction
refers to a decrease in the emission of CR when CS is presented
due to a formation of a new learning (memory trace #2 due to
CS repeatedly presented without the US). In other words, when
a conditioned stimulus is presented alone, and no longer predicts
the coming of the unconditioned stimulus, CR gradually stops. In
psychotherapy, extinction occurs when the patient is re-exposed
to the conditioned cue or conditioned context (say for example,
an elevator where the panic attacks started), in the absence of
the unconditioned stimulus (panic attack). In neural terms, the
memory trace #1 is not erased nor replaced by memory trace
#1. The proof of this is that in certain situations the memory
trace #1 spontaneously becomes reactivated (CR following CS).
We hypothesize that CER and the family of standard Cognitive-
Behavioral therapies, mainly rely on Extinction. The therapist
helps the patient to counteract past learning (in the form
of beliefs, attentive mechanisms, behavioral responses, etc.)
by adding new learning (positive thinking, attention training,
exposure. . .).
In this paper, we have presented some examples of cognitive
based techniques that may rely on this biological process
(see section “Experiential-Dynamic Techniques to Regulate
Emotions”). Although this is undoubtedly helpful for the patient
and proved to work, one problem of extinction-based techniques,
is that similarly to other kind of re-learnings, they are subject
to relapse in time (CR following CS). The indelibility of the
memory traced, implied strong limits to the possibility of effective
transformations in psychotherapy (Ecker et al., 2013). The only
possibility was a long relearning. However, from 1997 the
panorama dramatically changed and new challenging evidence
of the possibility to complete erase previous learned emotional
learning was provided (Sekiguchi et al., 1997; Roullet and Sara,
1998; Przybyslawski et al., 1999; Nader et al., 2000; Nader and
Einarsson, 2010; Ecker et al., 2013). Contrary to previous “static”
models of memory, the new vision of a “dynamic memory” states
that every time a memory is retrieved, the memory trace is labile
and can incorporate new learning that potentially alters and
even erase the original trace. Starting from animal experiments,
neuroscientists showed that target emotional memories can be
reactivated in a labile (plastic) state, that allows the learning
to be nullified (Ecker et al., 2012). This process is known
as Memory Reconsolidation (Nader et al., 2000; Nader and
Einarsson, 2010) and has been tested in various laboratory
settings and recently in more clinical settings (Ecker, 2006,
2008). For memory reconsolidation to happen, a series of steps
must be followed. First, the target emotional learning must be
reactivated. The memory trace is now in a labile state for a
few hours (Nader et al., 2000; Nader and Einarsson, 2010).
The fate of this memory trace depends on what happens in
the following hours. It can be re-consolidated, if an analog
experience happens, or de-consolidated. For de-consolidation to
occur, a critical additional experience must be provided while
the memory is in this labile state (Pedreira et al., 2004). This
experience must contain new elements that create a mismatch
with the previous learning (Ecker et al., 2012). When this
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happens, the emotional memory is erased and the mechanisms
elicited by that learning are no longer to elicited. Notably, the
autobiographical memory of the event that originally produced
the emotional learning is not impaired at all (Debiec et al.,
2006). What is erased is the emotional impact of that event and
the consequences that it brings (symptoms). We hypothesize
that once a Memory Reconsolidation process is reached in the
therapeutic settings, the dysregulated affect and the associated
mechanisms that produce the dysregulation stop. Interestingly,
different models of therapies (almost belonging to experiential
approaches, but not restricted to), in the recent past arrived at
similar conclusions and implemented similar processes in their
practice even before Memory Reconsolidation was discovered
(see for example, Accelerated Experiential Dynamic Therapy,
Fosha, 2000; Coherence Therapy, Ecker et al., 2012; ISTDP,
Davanloo, 1990, 2000; Emotion-Focused Therapy, Greenberg,
2004; Psychoanalytic Therapy, Gorman and Roose, 2011, and
others). We believe all the treatment modalities based on active
working and reworking of target emotional learnings (by means
of experiential techniques), foster Memory Reconsolidation. In
this paper, we have presented some examples of experiential
therapies that may foster this biological curative process (see
section “Cognitive-Experiential Techniques”). See Figure 1.
CONCLUSION
To sum up, in this paper we presented two approaches and related
techniques to foster emotion regulation in patients. We believe
both approaches can be useful and provide a wide plethora
of techniques that can enrich the toolbox of every therapist.
On one hand, CER approach considers emotions as generated
by appraisal and attentive processes. The clinician helps the
patient to reach better regulation by teaching new regulatory
strategies at the thinking level (mainly modifying pathological
appraisals), or at an attentional level (i.e., selective attention
for negative cues), or at a behavioral level (exposure, etc.).
Memory extinction may be the core biological mechanism behind
CBT techniques. The therapist helps the patient to activate top-
down mechanism (mainly situated in the prefrontal cortex), to
modulate subcortical areas responsible for emotion activation
(amygdala, insula, etc.). Consistently with this proposal, studies
of neurobiological changes due to CBT have shown increased
activation in the frontal cortical regions, such as prefrontal
cortex and anterior cingulate cortex (i.e., top-down processing),
and decreased activity in subcortical regions. Just to cite some
of these studies, augmented prefrontal activity has been found
for panic disorder (Prasko et al., 2004), depression (Goldapple
et al., 2004) and many others (see Beauregard, 2014 for a
review) after therapy.
On the other hand, EDER approach (Frederickson et al.,
2018), focuses on emotion itself, and not to cognitive, attentive
or behavioral mechanisms to change emotional responses. As
said before, EDER considers emotion and normal emotion
regulation as biological process independent from cognition and
conscious effort. EDER consider dysregulation as generated by
additional dysregulatory mechanisms (conditioned anxiety and
defensive mechanisms created by unpleasant life experiences).
The therapist helps the patient to remove these mechanisms
by asking the patient to attend and fully experience warded
off emotions without covering them with anxiety and defensive
mechanisms. In other words, by adding a new opposite
experience (say for example the experience of anger toward a
dismissing mother, instead of anxiety and/or defensive affects
that covered that anger), memory reconsolidation in subcortical
areas (supposingly, the amygdala and other key regions), but
also in fronto-ventral areas (orbito-frontal cortex, ventromedial
PFC, and ventral cingulate cortex, Gyurak and Etkin, 2014)
is thus facilitated. Evidence of the involvement of memory
reconsolidation during Experiential-Dynamic therapies are not
available yet. Further research is necessary to test this hypothesis.
We now make the point that therapists can use both sets
of techniques (and activate both neural mechanisms) at their
convenience. In this way the therapist can take advantage of both
sets of techniques and adapt to the needs and specific regulation
problems of her/his patient. Further research is needed to better
understand the ways both methodologies can be integrated and
when this is the case.
In conclusion, in this paper we pointed out that there are
two main modalities (CER vs. EDER) and descending groups
of techniques (mainly cognitive vs. mainly experiential) to help
the patient in better regulating distressing emotions. Both routes
serve the function to foster emotion regulation in patients and
can be integrated in clinical practice. Future research will explore
in further details differences and commonalities of these two
classes of processes and how they might influence emotion
regulation problems. The clinician may want to select one or the
other modality to help their patients to achieve better regulation
of emotions. It’s time for such an integration.
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